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ERISA PREEMPTION
"[A ny court forced to enter the ERISA preemption thicket sets out on a
treacherous path."'
INTRODUCTION
Private employers currently spend more than twenty-five percent of their
total compensation costs on employee benefits.' The steady growth in such
benefits, which began as a post-World War II phenomenon, led to the require-
ment of a comprehensive scheme to govern benefit programs.3 Historical mis-
use and mismanagement of pension and employee welfare plans, as well as
lack of regulation, prompted the enactment of the Employment Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).4
This Survey examines two ERISA preemption cases: Fuller v. Norton6
and Cannon v. Group Health Service, Inc.7 Part I of this Survey provides a
background on ERISA preemption, including the statutory language and a
brief chronology of key Supreme Court cases analyzing the scope of preemp-
tion. Part II examines Fuller, in which the Tenth Circuit held that a multiple
employer welfare arrangement (MEWA) was subject to Colorado's workers'
compensation regulations.' The court further held that a MEWA's partially-
insured status allowed regulation by the state's insurance division, thereby
1. Gonzales v. Prudential Ins. Co., 901 F.2d 446, 451-52 (5th Cir. 1990).
2. Charles S. Mishkind et al., Employee Benefits Litigation, in LrnGATING EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINAnON CAsES 1996, at 223, 231 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series
No. 542, 1996).
3. 1l
4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994); see RONALD J. COOKE, ERISA PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE 1-2 (2d ed. 1989); STEPHEN J. KRAss, THE PENsiON ANSWER BOOK 1-5 (6th ed. 1991)
(stating that ERISA was implemented in response to inadequately funded pension plans, plans
without retirement vesting provisions, and plans terminated prior to accumulation of sufficient
payout amounts).
5. The survey period covers the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals' decisions between Septem-
ber 1, 1995, and August 31, 1996.
6. 86 F.3d 1016 (10th Cir. 1996).
7. 77 F.3d 1270 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct 66 (1996). Other ERISA cases
decided by the Tenth Circuit during the Survey period include: Hawkins v. Commissioner, 86
F.3d 982 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that a marital settlement agreement incorporated into a divorce
decree was a qualified domestic relations order for purposes of determining tax liability); Thorpe
v. Retirement Plan of Pillsbury Co., 80 F.3d 439 (10th Cir. 1996) (involving withholding of early
retirement benefits); Herr v. Heiman, 75 F.3d 1509 (10th Cir. 1996) (identifying factors which
determine "employee" (as opposed to versus contractor) status under ERISA); Reich v. Stangl, 73
F.3d 1027 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 48 (1996) (holding ERISA grants authority to
the Secretary of Labor to seek equitable relief in an employee welfare benefit plan action);
Zimmerman v. Sloss Equip., Inc., 72 F.3d 822 (10th Cir. 1995) (upholding district court's finding
that an employer did not violate ERISA § 1140, governing protected rights, when terminating an
employee); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Financial Inst. Retirement Fund, 71 F.3d 1553 (10th Cir.
1995) (holding ERISA does not allow a "receiver's cash withdrawal of actuarially determined sur-
plus").
8. See Fuller, 86 F.3d at 1021-22.
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taking it outside the boundaries of ERISA preemption.9 Part Ill discusses
Cannon, which reflects the broad scope of ERISA preemption over state com-
mon law claims, even when preemption eclipses any remedy to the plaintiff.'"
I. GENERAL BACKGROUND
ERISA encompasses any employee pension" or welfare benefit plan.
ERISA health plans protect approximately 114 million Americans, or forty-
four percent of the population. 3 A benefit program delivering non-wage ben-
efits presumptively qualifies as an ERISA plan unless a specific exemption ap-
plies.' 4 ERISA seeks to protect plan beneficiaries by requiring that "minimum
standards be provided assuring the equitable character of such plans and their
financial soundness."" ERISA impacts states and employers in different
ways. For instance, states generally view ERISA as an impediment to their
ability to provide consistent protection for their citizens.'6 Conversely, em-
ployers view ERISA as critical to cost containment of benefit plans because
ERISA limits both administrative and litigation costs, while simultaneously
alleviating state imposed insurance premium taxes.'7
Within ERISA's administration and enforcement scheme," civil enforce-
9. See id. at 1026-27.
10. See Cannon, 77 F.3d at 1275.
11. "Employee pension benefit plan" is defined as:
any plan, fund or program which was heretofore or is hereafter established or maintained
by an employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to the extent that by its
express terms or as a result of surrounding circumstances such plan, fund, or program (i)
provides retirement income to employees; or (ii) results in a deferral of income by em-
ployees for periods extending to the termination of covered employment or beyond,
regardless of the method of calculating the contributions made to the plan, the method of
calculating the benefits under the plan or the method of distributing benefits from the
plan.
29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A).
12. "Employee welfare benefit plan" is defined as:
any plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter established or main-
tained by an employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to the extent that
such plan, fund, or program was established or is maintained for the purpose of provid-
ing for its participants or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or other-
wise, (A) medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sick-
ness, accident, disability, death or unemployment, or vacation benefits, apprenticeship or
other training programs, or day care centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid legal services,
or (B) any benefit described in section 186(c) of this title (other than pensions on retire-
ment or death, and insurance to provide such pensions).
29 U.S.C. § 1002(1).
13. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTINO OFFIcE, EMPLOYER-BAsED HEALTH PLANS: IssuEs,
TRENDS, AND CHALLENGES POSED BY ERISA 2 (1995) [hereinafter EMPLOYER-BASED HEALTH
PLANS).
14. Frank Cummings, ERISA Litigation: An Overview of Major Claims and Defenses, SB31
ALI-ABA 511, 515 (1996).
15. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a).
16. See EMPLOYER-BASED HEALTH PLANS, supra note 13. As more and more private em-
ployers opt to self-fund health plans, states find themselves with even less control, as ERISA does
not treat self-funded plans as insurance, therefore exempting the employer from compliance with
state regulation. See id. at 2.
17. See id. Self-funded plans are exempt from state insurance premium tax. Id.
18. ERISA is comprised of three subchapters. Subchapter I provides protection of employee
benefits. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1169. This subchapter is divided into a general provisions subtitle (§§
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ERISA
ment provides that a plan participant or beneficiary may sue "to recover bene-
fits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the
terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of
the plan."'9 The Supreme Court has held that claims brought in state court
against a plan sponsor or provider under this clause, pleading only state com-
mon law claims, can be removed to federal court.' The legislative intent of
ERISA is to recharacterize such actions as federal in nature.2 This is known
as the "complete preemption doctrine."
By comparison, conflict preemption occurs when both state law and
ERISA provide a cause of action, in which case "due regard for the federal
enactment requires that state jurisdiction must yield."'23 Conflict preemption in
ERISA actions results from interpretation of ERISA's preemption clause.2"
The clause states that the federal law will "supersede any and all state laws
insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan."
This preemption clause, in conjunction with the Act's savings clause,26 ex-
empts state insurance, banking, and securities regulations," and state criminal
laws' from preemption. Finally, ERISA's deemer clause2 excludes benefit
plans and their trusts from state regulation identified by the savings clause. 3
Roughly half of the Supreme Court ERISA cases involve preemption issues,
evidencing the confusion surrounding interpretation of the express preemption
1001-1003) and a subtitle for regulatory provisions (§§ 1021-1169). The regulatory provisions are
further broken down into six areas: reporting and disclosure (§§ 1021-1031), participation and
vesting (§§ 1051-1061), funding (§§ 1081-1086), fiduciary responsibility (§§ 1101-1114), admin-
istration and enforcement (§§ 1131-1145), and group health plans (§§ 1161-1169).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
20. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 67 (1987).
21. See id. at 65-66. ERISA preemption is an exception to the "well-pleaded complaint rule."
Id. at 65. The Court indicated that the clear legislative intent of the civil enforcement provisions
requires ERISA actions to be construed "as arising under the laws of the United States in similar
fashion to those brought under... [the] Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947." Id. at 65-66
(quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 93-1280, at 327 (1974)); see also Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No.
735, 390 U.S. 557, 561-62 (1968) (holding that federal removal of an action brought in state court
was proper under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, whose preemptive force
recharacterized the claim into one of federal question and, thus, completely displacing state ac-
tion).
22. This terminology is widely used by circuit courts. See, e.g.. Schmeling v. Nordam, 97
F.3d 1336, 1338 (10th Cir. 1996); Custer v. Sweeney, 89 F.3d 1156, 1164 (4th Cir. 1996). For the
substance of the doctrine, see Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 63-64 ("Congress may so
completely pre-empt a particular area that any civil complaint raising this select group of claims is
necessarily federal in character.").
23. Ingersoll-Rand v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 145 (1990) (quoting San Diego Bldg.
Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959)) (holding that ERISA preempted a state
claim for wrongful termination where employer allegedly attempted to avoid paying pension bene-
fit through employment termination).
24. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
25. Id
26. Id § 1144(b)(2)A) (stating that state laws regulating insurance, banking, and securities
shall apply to people of that.state).
27. ld. § 1144(b)(2)(A).
28. Id § 1144(b)(4).
29. Id § 1144(b)(2)(B). Under this clause, employee benefit plans governed by ERISA shall
not be "deemed" to include insurance companies, other insureds, or an entity engaging in the
business of insurance for the purposes of such state laws. Id.
30. Id
1997]
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clause, specifically the "relate to" language."
The Supreme Court addressed ERISA's preemption clause and the mean-
ing of its "relate to" language in Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc.32 In Shaw, the
Court found that New York's Human Rights and Disability Benefits Laws
"relate to" an ERISA plan.33 The Court, however, recognized a limit on
ERISA preemption if the state law is "too tenuous, remote, or peripheral"' to
the employee benefit plan." Subsequently, the Supreme Court in Metropoli-
tan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts Travelers Insurance Co.' held that a
state statute mandating minimum benefits for mental health regulated insur-
ance and was not preempted by ERISA.Y In this case, the Court urged that
the savings and deemer clauses be read together with a "common-sense
view."3 For example, ERISA exempts state insurance laws from its scope
but applies to state laws which regulate benefit plans or trusts.39 Justice
Blackmun's opinion recognized the confusing nature of ERISA preemption,
which generally preempts state laws, yet simultaneously reserves to states the
ability to regulate in certain narrow areas.'
In yet another preemption case, the Supreme Court examined these claus-
es and established that ERISA preempts state common law claims of bad faith
and tortious breach of contract against a health plan. insurer.4' Because the
Court concluded that a law regulating insurance must be "specifically directed
toward that industry," ERISA preempts these common law claims because
they may be brought against non-insurance defendants. 3 The Court empha-
sized that the underlying policy of ERISA's enforcement scheme supports
comprehensive and exclusive enforcement.'
In 1990, the Supreme Court interpreted ERISA's deemer clause as ex-
31. Catherine L Fisk, The Last Article About the Language of ERISA Preemption? A Case
Study of the Failure of Textualism, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 35, 59 (1996). The preemption clause
is fundamentally ambiguous because the "relate to" language "requires a modifier in order to have
a concrete meaning, and the wide spectrum of possible modifiers-directly, slightly, remote-
ly-suggests a wide spectrum of possible meanings." Id at 47.
32. 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
33. See Shaw, 463 U.S. at 100.
34. ld. at 100 n.21.
35. Id.
36. 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
37. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 471 U.S. at 758.
38. Id. at 740.
39. Id. at 741.
40. Id. at 739-40 (stating that the preemption and savings clauses are "not a model of legis-
lative drafting").
41. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 57 (1987).
42. lId at 50.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 54. The Court looked to the legislative history of ERISA:
Mhe substantive and enforcement provisions ... are intended to preempt the field...
thus, eliminating the threat of conflicting or inconsistent State and local regulation of
employee benefit plans. This principle is intended to apply in its broadest sense to all
actions of State or local governments, or any instrumentality thereof, which have the
force or effect of law.
Id. at 46 (quoting 120 CONG. REC. S29933 (daily ed. Aug. 22, 1974) (statement of Sen. Wil-
liams)).
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empting any self-funded employer plan from state insurance regulation.4
Subsequently, however, the Court ruled that ERISA preempts state law involv-
ing worker's compensation regulation, an area usually statutorily excluded
from ERISA when the state law "relates to" an employee welfare benefit
plan.4
Two recent decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court may signal a subtle
change in the trend of affording ERISA preemption the broadest possible in-
terpretation. In New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans
v. Travelers,4 the Court held that ERISA does not preempt a state law where
the law only indirectly influences an ERISA plan economically by affecting
the cost of insurance policies.' However, in Varity Corp. v. Howe,' the
Court allowed individuals to sue for benefit reinstatement when their employ-
er, acting in a fiduciary capacity as plan administrator, made misrepresenta-
tions to its employees about plan benefits." The Court stated that the purpose
of ERISA is to protect plan participants and beneficiaries, and that it is "hard
to imagine why Congress would want to immunize breaches of fiduciary obli-
gation that harm individuals by denying injured beneficiaries a remedy."'
Plaintiffs with denial of benefits claims may attempt to characterize them as
breach of fiduciary duty claims in an attempt to obtain redress. 2
The interplay between ERISA preemption and its exceptions is central to
this line of Supreme Court cases. ERISA's preemption clause, specifically its
"relate to" language, is decidedly ambiguous. Time and again the Court must
analyze the extent to which a state law "relates to" an ERISA plan. In these
cases the Court often affords preemption broad treatment. The narrow excep-
tions to ERISA's preemptive sweep include state insurance regulations as well
as plans maintained solely to comply with workers' compensation, unemploy-
ment, or disability laws.
45. FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 64-65 (1990).
46. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 126-
27 (1992). The Washington D.C. law at issue required employers providing employee health in-
surance to also provide equivalent health insurance to injured, worker's compensation eligible
employees. Id. ERISA language is clear that its provisions "shall not apply to any employee bene-
fit plan ... maintained solely for the purpose of complying with applicable workmen's compensa-
tion laws or unemployment compensation or disability insurance laws." 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(3)
(1994). Although this would seem to remove the law from the scope of ERISA preemption, the
Court held that regardless of such statutory language, the sweep of the preemption clause is opera-
tive where the worker's compensation plan was set by reference to the ERISA employee health
insurance plan. Greater Washington Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. at 130-31.
47. 115 S. CL 1671 (1995).
48. See Travelers, 115 S. Ct. at 1679. New York state law imposes hefty 24% hospital sur-
charges on commercially-insured patients while exempting those insured with Blue Cross/Blue
Shield from such surcharges because Blue Cross provides coverage to the commercially uninsur-
able. Id. at 1674, 1678.
49. 116 S. CL 1065 (1996).
50. Varify Corp., 116 S. CL at 1074, 1079.
51. Id. at 1078.
52. See Jeffrey Lewis & Dan Feinberg, Varity Corp. v. Howe: The Plaintiffs Perspective, 5
ERISA LrrG. REP., June 1996, at 3, 8.
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II. No ERISA PREEMPTION FOR MEWAS OVER STATE LAWS REGULATING
WORKERS' COMPENSATION & INSURANCE
A. Background
In Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 3 employers attempted to avoid a state
law requiring payment of disability benefits by claiming that the state law
"relates to" employee welfare benefits and was, therefore, preempted by
ERISA.' Although the Supreme Court held that a state may not regulate an
employer ERISA multibenefit plan, the state may enforce regulatory laws. 5
An employer, therefore, can be required by a state to maintain a separate ben-
efit plan for disability benefits providing the plan fails to comply with state
disability law. 6 The Shaw holding prevents employers from circumventing
state regulation by including disability benefits within a larger multibenefit
plan.
57
Subsequently, in Contract Services Employee Trust v. Davis,58 the Tenth
Circuit held that ERISA did not preempt Oklahoma's worker compensation
regulations.5 9 This holding was consistent with recent decisions of both the
First and Ninth Circuits.6a The Ninth Circuit held that an employer offering a
multibenefit plan could not use preemption to circumvent state regulation.6
When complying with a state regulation, an ERISA plan provider may experi-
ence burdensome economic implications. These implications, however, do not
"relate to" the plan so as to trigger ERISA preemption.61 Similarly, the court
concluded that an employer may not "don the mantle of ERISA preemption
simply by including workers' compensation benefits in its welfare benefit plan
and thereby escape the requirements of Maine's law."
ERISA defines a multiple employer welfare arrangement (MEWA) as "an
employee welfare benefit plan, or any other arrangement... which is estab-
lished or maintained for the purpose of offering or providing any benefit...
to the employees of two or more employers.., or to their beneficiaries."
The deemer clause excludes single-employer benefit plans from state regula-
tion,' but MEWAs may not claim such exclusion.' Therefore, while a
53. 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
54. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96.
55. Id. at 108.
56. Id. The Court examined the language of ERISA's § 1003(b)(3), which exempts plans
maintained "solely" to comply with state disability law. Id. at 107. The multibenefit plans at issue
did not exist "solely" to comply with state disability law, hence, appellee airlines' argument that
exemption from ERISA was inapplicable. Id.
57. Id. at 108.
58. 55 F.3d 533 (10th Cir. 1995). This case involved an attempt by a multiemployer trade
association to use ERISA preemption to alleviate their responsibility under Oklahoma worker's
compensation regulation. Id at 535.
59. See Contract Serv. Employee Trust, 55 F.3d at 534.
60. See Combined Management, Inc. v. Superintendent of Ins., 22 F.3d 1 (lst Cir. 1994);
Employee Staffing Serv., Inc. v. Aubry, 20 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. 1994).
61. Employee Staffing Serv., 20 F.3d at 1040.
62. Id. at 1042.
63. Combined Management, 22 F.3d at 5.
64. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(40)(A) (1994).
65. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(6)(A) (1994).
66. Employee plans operating as fully-insured MEWAs are subject to "any law of any State
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MEWA delivers ERISA benefits to more than one employer, it is subject to
state law. State law holds MEWAs accountable to prevent entrepreneurs from
operating as profitable insurance ventures under the guise of an ERISA plan,
without being subject to state insurance laws.67 The legislative history of the
MEWA amendment indicates a desire to end multiple employer organization
abuse that uses ERISA preemption to avoid state insurance regulation.' A
Second Circuit decision, Atlantic Healthcare Benefits Trust v. Googins, 9 de-
termined that the MEWA clause operates as an exception to the deemer
clause-MEWAs may be construed as insurance entities, thereby allowing
state regulation.0
B. Fuller v. Norton71
1. Facts
The International Association of Entrepreneurs of America (IAEA), a non-
profit organization, sought to establish to offer its member employers partici-
pation in an employee welfare benefit plan.' This multiple employer welfare
arrangement established a trust, funded by employer contributions, to provide
employee benefits such as health, accident or disability insurance." In re-
sponse to an attempt by the IAEA's plan trustee to certify the trust, the Colo-
rado Division of Insurance ordered the temporary cessation of business activi-
ty."" Once the trust complied with workers' compensation and other Division
requirements, it could resume operation." The trustee sought a declaratory
judgment on two grounds. First, he claimed that because ERISA regulates
MEWAs, the IAEA was exempt from state workers' compensation or insur-
which regulates insurance." Id. § 1144(b)(6)(A)(i). Non-fully insured MEWAs are subject to "any
law of any State which regulates insurance... to the extent not inconsistent with the preceding
sections of this subchapter." Id § 1144(b)(6)(A)(ii).
67. Roger C. Siske et al., What's New in Employee Benefits: A Summary of Current Case
and Other Developments. CA62 ALI-ABA 1, 118 (1996). ERISA defines an "employer" as "any
person acting directly as an employer, or indirectly in the interest of an employer, in relation to an
employee benefit plan; and includes a group or association of employers acting for an employer in
such capacity." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(5). The issue, therefore, is to distinguish between an ERISA
plan established by such an association or group from for-profit insurance ventures attempting to
circumvent state regulation. International Ass'n of Entrepreneurs of Am. Benefit Trust v. Foster,
883 F. Supp. 1050. 1057 (E.D. Va. 1995). The Ninth Circuit held that ERISA's definition of "em-
ployer" requires a "bona fide 'organizational relationship' among the members other than a mere
association for the purpose of qualifying for benefits." Moideen v. Gillespie, 55 F.3d 1478, 1481
(9th Cir. 1995).
68. 128 CoNG. REc. H30356 (daily ed. Dec. 13, 1982) (statement of Rep. Erlenborn)
(proposing this amendment to close off any opportunity for MEWA operators to skirt state regula-
tion).
69. 2 F.3d I (2d Cir. 1993).
70. See Atlantic Healthcare Benefits Trust, 2 F.3d at 5. This case sought declaratory judg-
ment that ERISA preempts a MEWA from state insurance regulation. Id. at 2-3. The court con-
strued the 1983 MEWA amendment to allow states to regulate MEWAs as insurance companies.
See id. at 5.
71. 86 F.3d 1016 (10th Cir. 1996).
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ance regulatory schemes.76 Second, the trustee argued that Colorado MEWA
regulation violated the Commerce" and Equal Protection Clauses." The
district court dismissed the action and held that Colorado regulation of
MEWAs under insurance and workers' compensation regulations were excep-
tions to ERISA preemption.'m
2. Decision
In affirming the lower court decision, the Tenth Circuit held that non-fully
insured MEWAs are subject to state insurance regulatory laws and exempt
from ERISA preemption." State workers' compensation regulations apply to
benefits offered within a multibenefit planY The court concluded that al-
though workers' compensation regulations may economically impact an em-
ployee benefit plan, the regulations do not therefore "relate to" an ERISA
plan.s3 The court further held that a Colorado state statute extending Insur-
ance Division jurisdiction over MEWAs for compliance purposes was consis-
tent with the statutory interpretation of ERISA's MEWA amendment.U
C. Analysis
ERISA's statutory language excludes worker's compensation programs
from its preemptive sweep. In some circumstances, however, the preemption
clause will encompass such programs if they "relate to" an ERISA benefit
plan.' When employers offer worker's compensation benefits as part of a
multibenefit ERISA plan, ERISA will not preempt the state regulatory
scheme.s"
Further, the court construed the MEWA amendment to reserve regulation
of non-fully insured MEWAs to the state. Here, Colorado's MEWA regulation
requires certain reporting, disclosure and funding requirements. This state law
does not foreclose the trust from operating in Colorado, which would be in-
consistent with ERISA requirements. Instead, the law merely applies its insur-
ance requirements to MEWAs as authorized by ERISA. Consequently, the
IAEA trust failed in its attempt to escape Colorado insurance regulation on
two grounds: the regulation involved worker's compensation and the trust
76. Id.
77. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, c1. 3.
78. U.S. CoNSr. amend. XlV, § 1.
79. Fu/Uer, 86 F.3d at 1019.
80. See Fuller v. Norton, 881 F. Supp. 468, 471 (1995).
81. Fu/er, 86 F.3d at 1019.
82. I& at 1021-22.
83. Id. at 1021.
84. Treatment of Multiple Employer welfare Arrangements Under Employee Retirement In-
come Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 97-473, 96 Stat. 2612 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1002, 1144(b) (1994)); Fu//er, 86 F.3d at 1024-25. The relevant part of the Colorado statute at
issue in this case provides that "[nlothing ... shall ... limit the ability of the division of insur-
ance to regulate... multiple employer welfare arrangements." CoLo. REv. STAT. § 10-3-
903.5(2)(1994).
85. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
86. See discussion supra Part H. A.
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qualified as a MEWA.
D. Other Circuits
The Tenth Circuit is consistent with other circuits in its approach to
worker's compensation regulation. Several circuits have entertained the same
plaintiff seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from compliance with state
insurance regulation.' None of these circuits found the IAEA trust exempt
from state regulations."
In the Eighth Circuit, the court did not even address ERISA preemption,
stating that the threshold question is whether the trust was an ERISA plan."
Other circuits disposed of IAEA's ERISA claim using similar reasoning as the
Tenth Circuit. The Seventh Circuit held that ERISA did not preempt workers'
compensation regulations even when an employer offered the benefits within a
multiple benefit plan.'e Consequently, the state possessed the right to ensure
the provision of workers' compensation benefits in accordance with the state
workers' compensation regulations.9 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit found that
ERISA would not preempt provisions of the Louisiana workers' compensation
regulations." In this case, state workers' compensation regulations indirectly
increased the cost of an ERISA plan but did not "relate to" that plan.93
III. STATE COMMON LAW CLAims PREEMPTED DESPrrE LACK OF
ALTERNATE REMEDY
A. Background
Case law supporting preemption of state law claims began with Pilot Life
Ins. Co.94 ERISA preempts claims for state tort or breach of contract ac-
tions-specifically bad faith for improper handling of a claim under the
plan." This preemption analysis examines whether the law "relates to" an
ERISA plan. If so, ERISA will preempt the state claims.9 The savings
87. See Fuller v. Skornicka, 79 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 1996); Fuller v. Ulland, 76 F.3d 957 (8th
Cir. 1996); International Ass'n of Entrepreneurs of Am. v. Angoff, 58 F.3d 1266 (8th Cir. 1995);
Combined Management, Inc. v. Superintendent of Ins., 22 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1994); International
Ass'n of Entrepreneurs of Am. Benefit Trust v. Foster, 883 F. Supp. 1050 (E.D. Va. 1995).
88. See infra notes 89-98 and accompanying text.
89. See Fuler, 76 F.3d at 960, 960 n.4 (remanding case to state court to determine if IAEA
Trust is an ERISA-covered plan and noting that IAEA trust has been found by one district court
not to be an ERISA plan); International Ass'n of Entrepreneurs of Am., 58 F.3d at 1269 (conclud-
ing that concurrent jurisdiction exists to determine ERISA status of JAEA's trust).
90. Fuller v. Skornicka, 79 F.3d at 687.
91. I.
92. Martco Partnership v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 86 F.3d 459, 463 (5th Cir. 1996).
93. Id. at 463. The offset provisions of Louisiana worker's compensation law only deter-
mines the employer's obligation to the beneficiary. Id. The fact that the insurance provider chose
to reference the state law in its policy is not sufficient to trigger preemption. Id.
94. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux. 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
95. See generally id (holding ERISA preempted a state claim for improper processing of
benefit claims under an ERISA-regulated plan because state common law did not regulate insur-
ance as defined by ERISA's savings clause).
96. Id. at 47.
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clause9 prevents ERISA preemption only when the law is "specifically di-
rected toward [the insurance] industry."
In Pilot Life Insurance, the Supreme Court focused on the language of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act" in reaching its decision." The Court articulated
three criteria which identify the "business of insurance," triggering ERISA's
savings clause: (1) the law effects a spreading of risk; (2) the law is an inte-
gral part of the relationship between the insurer and insured; and (3) the law is
limited to insurance industry entities.'" The narrow exception carved out in
ERISA's language, to allow state regulation in certain areas, does not apply in
lawsuits brought against insurers operating as claims processors for a benefit
plan. °2 There is no state tort liability against an insurance company for pro-
cessing claims because ERISA's exclusive enforcement scheme provides a
remedy for denial of benefits."e3
B. Cannon v. Group Health Service, Inc."°w
1. Facts
The plaintiff was a group plan beneficiary who filed a claim against
Group Health Service, Inc. and GHS Health Maintenance Organization, Inc.
for- (1) negligence and bad faith refusal to authorize an autologous bone mar-
row transplant (ABMT) treatment in a timely fashion; (2) breach of contract;
and (3) breach of fiduciary duty." Blue Lincs HMO insured the plaintiff's
wife, Mrs. Cannon. She was diagnosed and treated for leukemia.'0 While in
remission, her physician sought approval for ABMT as a course of
treatment," but the insurer promptly refused the treatment as experimen-
tal."U The physician requested a reconsideration and provided literature to
support his contention that ABMT treatment was not experimental.'09 The
insurer again denied approval of the ABMT but authorized the treatment after
a third request."0 The plaintiff's wife, however, received notice of this ap-
proval after suffering a recurrence of cancer, rendering any ABMT treatment
ineffective."' Mrs. Cannon died approximately six weeks after she received
97. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
98. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 50.
99. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1994). That Act states, "The business of insurance, and every
person engaged therein, shall be subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the regu-
lation or taxation of such business." Id. § 1012(a).
100. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 50.
101. Id at 48-49 (quoting Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119 (1982)).
102. Fisk, supra note 31, 101, at 51.
103. See supra text accompanying note 19. ERISA, however, does not provide for punitive or
compensatory damages. Fisk, supra note 31, 101, at 51.
104. 77 F.3d 1270 (10th Cir. 1996).
105. Cannon, 77 F.3d at 1272.
106. Id at 1271.
107. Id The physician emphasized to the insurer that the transplant, to be effective, must be







Defendant removed the claim to federal court under ERISA preemp-
tion. 13 After denying plaintiff's motion for remand, the district court granted
summary judgment to the insurer, finding that the plaintiff's claims "related
to" an ERISA health plan."'
2. Decision
The plaintiff appealed the lower court decision on three grounds: (1)
ERISA does not preempt a claim for which ERISA provides no remedy; (2)
preemption of the claim without a remedy violated plaintiff's fundamental
right of access to justice; and (3) that the federal common law equitable estop-
pel allowed his claim."'
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court decision." 6 The
court held that ERISA preemption applies to common law state tort and con-
tract actions and, further, that the absence of an ERISA remedy fails to impact
preemption." '7 Interpreting ERISA's savings and deemer clauses," 8 the
court found that an insurance provider of ERISA plan benefits cannot be
deemed an insurance company subject to state insurance regulation."9
Plaintiff argued that ERISA preemption violates a constitutional "right to
access justice."'' " The Tenth Circuit concluded that the Supreme Court has
not defined such a broad fundamental right to access justice, and dismissed
this claim.''
Finally, the court dismissed plaintiff's claim for equitable estoppel under
federal common law." In so doing, the court identified the elements for a
claim of common law equitable estoppel: (1) misrepresentation of material
facts; (2) which is intentional; (3) when the party to be estopped was aware of
the true facts; and (4) an ignorant party relied on the misrepresented facts; (5)
to his or her detriment."2 The court stated that the delay in the ABMT pro-
cedure resulted from plan interpretation rather than misrepresentation.'24
Consequently, the Tenth Circuit dismissed this claim without adopting or re-




113. Id. at 1272.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1274.
117. See id.
118. See supra text accompanying notes 26-29, 30.
119. Cannon, 77 F.3d at 1275. The court found that the deemer clause contradicted plaintiff's
argument because it specifically excludes ERISA benefit plans from state regulation. Id.
120. Id. Plaintiff claimed this right was conferred by the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause and the Ninth Amendment. The latter amendment, e argued, and the Magna Carta, guar-
antee a right to redress through access to the courts. id.
121. Id at 1276.
122. See id. at 1277.
123. Id. at 1276-77.
.124. Id. at 1277.
125. Id
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C. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit recognized that a plaintiff may be left without recourse
if ERISA preempts state law claims but ERISA provides no remedy."M Al-
though sound reasons exist for creating an exception to ERISA to address this,
the court indicated that Congress, and not the judiciary, is the appropriate
forum for such policy choices.'"
Mr. Cannon claimed a state tort action of negligence or bad faith against
the insurer for its failure to timely authorize the ABMT." This case falls
within a growing body of ERISA benefit claims called "betrayal without reme-
dy" cases.'M" In these cases, the insurer promised the plan participant a bene-
fit, or the insurer made a representation regarding a benefit, which is not in
accordance with the plan.' Where, as in this case, the insurance coverage
"relates to" an ERISA benefit plan, ERISA preempts the claim.'' Once
ERISA preempts, no remedy exists under the Act's statutory scheme because
enforcement is limited to benefits defined under the plan or expenses actually
incurred. 32
The Tenth Circuit addressed the equitable estoppel argument advanced by
plaintiff. "' Some circuits have allowed a claim for federal common law eq-
uitable estoppel in cases where a plan beneficiary detrimentally relies on an
ambiguous plan provision." In these cases, a provider is estopped from de-
nying liability because of an intentional misrepresentation of a material
fact.3 Because ERISA requires maintenance of a written plan, informal plan
modifications are not subject to equitable estoppel." s When an ambiguous
plan provision exists and a plan representative interprets such a provision,
common law equitable estoppel may be invoked.' The fight in Cannon re-
garded interpretation of the ABMT provision of Mrs. Cannon's plan. Here, the
court found that the requisite equitable estoppel elements of misrepresentation
and detrimental reliance were absent.M Consequently, the court dismissed
126. Id. at 1274.
127. ld.
128. ld. at 1272.
129. Preemption--The Inconsistent Oral Promise to Pay Benefits, ERISA LniiO. REP., Feb.
1993, at 9. The Fifth Circuit first coined the phrase "betrayal without remedy" in Degan v. Ford
Motor Co., 869 F.2d 889, 895 (5th Cir. 1989).
130. Cannon, 77 F.3d at 1271-72. The insurer approved the procedure notwithstanding the
language of the rider to the plaintiff's health plan excluding ABMT benefits to treat acute leuke-
mia in first remission. Id. at 1272.
131. See supra text accompanying note 25.
132. See supra text accompanying note 19.
133. See id. at 1276-77.
134. See, e.g., National Cos. Health Benefit Plan v. St. Joseph's Hosp., Inc., 929 F.2d 1558,
1572 (11th Cir. 1991) (identifying the elements of federal common law equitable estoppel). Com-
pare Kane v. Aetna Life Ins., 893 F.2d 1283, 1285 (11th Cir. 1990) (applying equitable estoppel
where ERISA plan provision interpretation is ambiguous and insured detrimentally relies on such
interpretation), with Nachwalter v. Christie, 805 F.2d 956, 960 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding equitable
estoppel not applicable to enforce oral modification of ERISA plan).
135. National Cos. Health Benefit Plan, 929 F.2d at 1572.
136. Nachwalter, 805 F.2d at 960.
137. Kane, 893 F.2d at 1286.
138. Cannon, 77 F.3d at 1277.
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this claim for relief without adopting the equitable estoppel cause of ac-
tion.139
D. Other Circuits
During this survey period, the federal circuit courts continued the trend of
broad application of ERISA preemption involving state law claims. The Sixth
Circuit supported ERISA preemption for state common law tort actions
brought against an insurer." The Eleventh Circuit has expressed its concern
that ERISA's broad reach leaves plaintiffs without a remedy. " In that case,
ERISA preempted a fraudulent misrepresentation claim against an insurer be-
cause plaintiff tied the claim to a denial of benefits claim.'"
Two vicarious liability claims brought in the Seventh Circuit against
ERISA plan administrators for the alleged negligence of their provider physi-
cians proved unavailing. In Rice v. Panchal,'" the court analyzed federal
question jurisdiction in ERISA cases conferred via complete preemption, as
distinguished from the defensive posture of conflict preemption arising in
ERISA cases.'" Because the claim did not enforce any rights under the plan
and did not require interpretation of an ERISA plan, removal to federal court
was inappropriate under complete preemption. I" The court left open the pos-
sibility that "conflict preemption" may provide the vehicle for removal." In
Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc.," the claim involved vicarious
liability against an ERISA plan administrator for the negligence of a provider
physician and nurse.'" The court held that ERISA preemption applied be-
cause the claim involved interpretation of the plan." This claim was distin-
guished from the Tenth Circuit's holding in Pacificare of Oklahoma, Inc. v.
Burrage,"0 because this physician's negligence was tied to the benefits de-
termination and because he was not an HMO employed physician but, rather
an independent contractor."'
Other circuits addressed equitable estoppel claims against ERISA plan
providers but provided no relief to plaintiffs. 2 The Ninth Circuit heard two
139. See id.
140. See Schachner v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 77 F.3d 889, 898 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding
that ERISA preempts Ohio law of bad faith, breach of contract and negligence against insurer).
141. See Morstein v. National Ins. Servs., Inc., 74 F.3d 1135, 1138 n.3 (11th Cir. 1996) (ex-
pressing regret that "the reach of ERISA preemption too often undermines the stated purpose of
the Act: to protect employees and beneficiaries of employee benefit plans").
142. See id at 1137-38.
143. 65 F.3d 637, 646 (7th Cir. 1995).
144. Rice, 65 F.3d at 639-40.
145. Maat 646.
146. See id.
147. 88 F.3d 1482, 1495 (7th Cir. 1996).
148. Jass, 88 F.3d at 1484.
149. 1& at 1489. The vicarious liability claim for the nurse's negligence was a denial of bene-
fits invoking ERISA preemption. I& The vicarious liability claim of negligence against the plan
for the physician required examination of the plan. d. at 1493.
150. 59 F.3d 151 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that ERISA does not preempt a vicarious liability
claim against an HMO for the negligence of its physician).
151. See Jass, 88 F.3d at 1494.
152. See F'mk v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 94 F.3d 489 (8th Cir. 1996); Pisciotta v. Teledyne
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cases seeking equitable estoppel relief for alleged violation of ERISA plan
provisions,' 3 and articulated its requirements for a bona fide claim: (1) ma-
terial misrepresentation; (2) reasonable detrimental reliance; (3) extraordinary
circumstances; (4) ambiguous plan term; and (5) misrepresentation based on
an oral plan interpretation." In both cases before the Ninth Circuit, the eq-
uitable estoppel claims were unsuccessful because the ERISA plan provisions
were unambiguous.'55
The Eighth Circuit held equitable estoppel inapplicable against an insurer
where the beneficiary was ineligible for the plan benefiL" The Second Cir-
cuit adheres to "principles of estoppel" in ERISA cases only under "extraordi-
nary circumstances."'' 1 The court articulated this requirement as well as
promissory estoppel elements in a severance benefits dispute.'58
CONCLUSION
In Fuller, the Tenth Circuit supported state regulation of workers' com-
pensation benefits notwithstanding that an ERISA plan structure encompasses
these benefits.' 9 Although states may not regulate an ERISA plan, compli-
ance with regulatory laws to ensure worker protection enables the state to
require a separate plan for purposes of compliance with state law."s Non-
Indus., 91 F.3d 1326 (9th Cir. 1996); Schonholz v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 87 F.3d 72 (2d
Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. CL 511 (1996); Marx v. Loral Corp., 87 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir.
1996); In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 85 F.3d 992 (2d Cir. 1996); Jenkins v. Montgomery Indus.,
77 F.3d 740 (4th Cir. 1996).
153. See Piscionta, 91 F.3d at 1326; Marx, 87 F.3d at 1049.
154. Pisciotta, 91 F.3d at 1331.
155. In Pisciotta, a retiree class alleged an ERISA violation when a former employer modi-
fied its health plan after promising to pay the full amount of retiree medical premiums for life. Id.
at 1329. Retirees relied on an insurance booklet, but the plan controlled and was held not ambigu-
ous. Id. at 1330-31. The second equitable estoppel case, Marx, involved a retiree class action that
alleged misrepresentations made to beneficiaries that plan provisions would not change when the
company was sold. Marx, 87 F.3d at 1051-52. The Marx court held that if a plan sufficiently
outlines a procedure to amend benefits, then no ambiguity exists in the plan provisions. Id at
1056.
156. See Fink, 94 F.3d at 492 (restricting equitable estoppel where a dispute over payout of
death benefit involved decedent's eligibility for group life policy and decedent was not an active,
full-time employee at the time of death).
157. Lee v. Burkhart, 991 F.2d 1004, 1009 (2d Cir. 1993); see also Gridley v. Cleveland
Pneumatic Co., 924 F.2d 1310, 1319 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding equitable estoppel only available
with showing of "extraordinary circumstances" in ERISA disputes going beyond ordinary elements
of equitable estoppel); Hozier v. Midwest Fasteners, Inc., 908 F.2d 1155, 1165 n.10 (3d Cir. 1990)
(finding practice of paying severance benefit to employees, beyond plan terms, may be implied
representation of continuation of the benefit to other employees, but does not qualify as an ex-
traordinary circumstance). But see Rosen v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders Union,
637 F.2d 592, 598 (3d Cir. 1981) (holding that extraordinary circumstances exist and pension plan
trustee was estopped from denying pension payout where trustee advised employee that employer
contributions to the fund were in arrears and employee subsequently deposited money to fund to
cover arrearage).
158. See Schonholz, 87 F.3d at 72 (holding that genuine issues of material fact existed on
estoppel claim). The court relied on the language of ERISA and the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CoNTRAS § 90(1) (1979), to determine that employer's letter constituted a sufficiently definite
promise to the terminating employee such that employer reasonably should have expected "to
induce action or forbearance on the [plaintiff's] part." Id. at 79.
159. See Fuller v. Norton, 86 F.3d 1016, 1021-22 (10th Cir. 1996).
160. Id. at 1021.
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ERISA
fully insured multiple employer welfare arrangements are subject to Colorado
regulatory law irrespective of ERISA's broad preemptive sweep.'6'
In Cannon, the court found preemption operative over state common law
claims.'" Plan beneficiaries may, as the Cannon case demonstrates, find
themselves victims of the "betrayal without a remedy" dilemma. 63 The
Tenth Circuit rejected plaintiff's equitable estoppel claim, but stopped short of
adopting or rejecting equitable estoppel in ERISA cases.'" Should the Tenth
Circuit decide to adopt equitable estoppel in future ERISA actions it may, in
certain instances, provide a sorely needed vehicle for relief to "betrayal with-
out remedy" plaintiffs.
Historically, ERISA preemption has been broadly applied, while the reme-
dies available to beneficiaries are few."e Indeed, as Justice Birch stated in
his dissent in Sanson v. General Motors Corp.,'" the purpose of ERISA is to
protect plan beneficiaries, but an overbroad reading of ERISA preemption case
law may allow an employer to "hoodwink a long time employee and leave
him stranded without any recourse whatsoever" and "[that] result stands the
entire statutory scheme on its proverbial head.'
67
ERISA preemption continues to be a highly litigated area because of the
complex nature of this federal law. Meanwhile, interpretation of ERISA's
preemption, savings, and deemer clauses frustrates the courts." Congress
wanted ERISA to provide a broad and exclusive framework for the adminis-
tration of employee benefits."6 Consequently, it is likely that ERISA pre-
emption will continue unabated.
Jane D. Bailey
161. Id. at 1024.
162. See Cannon v. Group Health Serv., Inc., 77 F.3d 1270, 1274 (10th Cir. 1996).
163. See id.
164. Id. at 1277.
165. Lewis & Feinberg, supra note 52, at 3.
166. 966 F.2d 618 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding that a retiree's claim that the former employer
had fraudulently misrepresented availability of benefits was preempted by ERISA).
167. Sanson, 966 F.2d at 623 (Birch, J., dissenting).
168. See, e.g., New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 115 S. C. 1671, 1676 (1995) (discussing ERISA's "relate to" and "connection with"
language as "unhelpful text" and "frustrating" while "look[ing] instead to the objectives of the
ERISA statute as a guide").
169. See supra note 44.
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